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Digital signatures ensure the integrity of a classical message and the authenticity of its sender. Despite their
far-reaching use in modern communication, currently used signature schemes rely on computational assumptions
and will be rendered insecure by a quantum computer. We present a quantum digital signatures (QDS) scheme
whose security is instead based on the impossibility of perfectly and deterministically distinguishing between
quantum states. Our continuous-variable (CV) scheme relies on phase measurement of a distributed alphabet of
coherent states and allows for secure message authentication against a quantum adversary performing collective
beamsplitter and entangling-cloner attacks. Crucially, in the CV setting we allow for an eavesdropper on the
quantum channels and yet retain shorter signature lengths than previous protocols with no eavesdropper. This
opens up the possibility to implement CV QDS alongside existing CV quantum key distribution platforms with
minimal modification.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.99.032341
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures are among the most commonly used
primitives in modern cryptography [1,2]. Like a handwritten
signature, a digital signature ensures the authenticity of both a
classical message and its sender. Inherently involving multiple
parties, the signature prevents a malevolent party from creat-
ing a false message and attributing it to an honest party; and
if the signature convinces one party that a message is genuine
then it should convince the other parties. Despite their far-
reaching use in our modern technological infrastructure—e.g.,
in e-commerce, online banking, and checking the integrity of
downloads—currently used signature schemes such as RSA,
DSA, and ECDSA will be rendered insecure by a future
quantum computer [2–5].
Quantum digital signatures (QDS) rectify this by basing
their security not on computational assumptions about diffi-
cult to invert “one-way functions,” but on physical properties,
namely, the impossibility to perfectly and deterministically
distinguish between nonorthogonal quantum states [4–16].
Quantum states are used to distribute a classical signature
which is later used to sign a classical message. While modern
QDS shares some similarities in implementation with quan-
tum key distribution (QKD), their aims differ significantly.
The most notable difference is that that—unlike QKD—in
QDS any subset of the participants may be dishonest, and each
dishonest player may have different goals and strategies which
must be considered in a full proof.
Although the first QDS schemes [6] relied on infeasible
requirements like the production and storage of large entan-
gled states, there has since been a push towards practical
and implementable QDS. The past decade has done away
with the need for an optical multiport [7,8], quantum memory
[9,10], and recent progress has even removed the need for
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single photon sources [11–14] for secure QDS. More recently,
the assumption of secure quantum channels for distribution
of quantum states has been discarded, and modern QDS
protocols take into account both the ability for a player inside
the scheme to be dishonest, and the presence of an external
eavesdropper [13,15,16].
As with QKD, there are two approaches to QDS, the
discrete-variable (DV) and continuous-variable (CV) proto-
cols. DV QDS relies on photon-number detection of ei-
ther weak coherent pulses [13,14,17–19] or single photons
[16,20]. The relatively low-dimensional Hilbert space re-
quired for these schemes allows for an advanced level of
security analysis, and their high resilience to loss allows for
long distances to be bridged securely, with O(10−1) s required
to sign a 1-bit message [17,21,22]. The first QDS scheme over
insecure channels required a signature length of 7.7 × 105 to
sign a 1 bit message, in a scheme similar to decoy-state QKD
[13].
In contrast, CV QDS encodes information into continuous
degrees of freedom, usually the phase of the electromag-
netic field, and homodyne detection [11]—though a “hybrid”
scheme has been proposed [12] and implemented [23], relying
on both phase-encoded coherent states and single-photon
detection. Despite the theoretical difficulties in dealing with
large Hilbert spaces in a cryptographic setting the CV plat-
form is much easier to implement, operates at room tem-
perature and can use standard telecom hardware, making it
thus closer to currently implemented large-scale infrastructure
[24,25].
In the present paper we introduce a CV QDS protocol
based on a discrete-modulated alphabet of coherent states,
and the heterodyne detection of phase. Such cheap and read-
ily available resources make our scheme highly compatible
with telecom infrastructure. Crucially, and in contrast to our
previous paper [11], we now take into account the fact that
the quantum distribution channels may in general be insecure
and under the control of a malevolent party. Thus, we guard
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not only against dishonest participants inside the protocol but
also against an external eavesdropper.
Our scheme is a fully CV QDS scheme to run over in-
secure quantum channels. Remarkably, despite relaxing an
assumption on the quantum channels we are able to reduce the
number of quantum states required to securely sign a message.
We provide a security proof and demonstrate that the success
probability of an eavesdropper can be made arbitrarily small.
Our security proof provides collective security against both
beamsplitter attacks and entangling-cloner attacks, with the
main feature of the proof being that a dishonest player may
fail to correctly identify an element of the signature and yet
still remain undetected to the honest parties.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we describe
our protocol and briefly discuss the origin of its security. Our
security proof follows in Sec. III, and in Sec. IV we analyse
the protocol’s performance. Finally, in Sec. V we compare
our protocol to its nearest competitors and discuss potential
extensions to our security analysis. Technical details and a
generalization of the protocol may be found in the appendices.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In the simplest instance we consider a signature scheme
involving three parties: a sender, Alice (A), and recipients,
Bob (B) and Charlie (C). Alice wishes to send a classical 1
bit message m to Bob, which he will forward to Charlie. This
scheme may be readily extended to include more players [26]
or longer messages [27,28].
In a successful QDS scheme, Bob and Charlie should be
able to determine that Alice is the genuine author of m.
In particular, the scheme should guard against a dishonest
player—or an external Eve—from successfully forging a mes-
sage which is then accepted as genuine. It should also prevent
Alice from repudiating, which occurs if Alice convinces Bob
that a message is genuine and Charlie that it is fake. The
scheme should succeed if all parties are honest, except with
negligible probability. We allow at most one of the players to
be dishonest, noting that a three-party protocol fails trivially
if more dishonest players are permitted.
We focus on the quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK)
alphabet of four phase-encoded coherent states, denoted A4
[24,25,29] distributed equally around the axis in phase space
(Fig. 1, inset). In Appendix B we demonstrate how larger
alphabetsAN may be incorporated into our proof and analysis.
The QDS scheme is split into two stages, distribution and
messaging, which can occur with significant time delay. The
coherent states are sent by Alice and measured by Bob and
Charlie during distribution, while during messaging Alice
will send the message m to Bob, accompanied by a classical
signature. This signature is her classical declaration of which
quantum states she sent. By comparing her declaration to
their measurement outcomes, Bob and Charlie can determine
whether m is genuine. Our protocol is outlined in Fig. 1 and
described in full, below.
A. Distribution stage: 1–4
(1) Alice wishes to send a signed 1 bit message m to Bob
and Charlie. For each possible m, Alice creates two different
FIG. 1. Schematic of three-party QDS. The parties share quan-
tum distribution channels (solid lines), public classical channels
(dot-dashed lines), and Bob and Charlie share an encrypted classical
channel (dashed lines). Initially, sender A distributes her classical
signatures {Bm,Cm} via the quantum states |αφB,Cj 〉 by encoding into
the QPSK alphabet. Then she sends a message m to recipients Bob
(B) and Charlie (C), with the corresponding signatures, through the
public classical channel. B and C use the signatures to authenticate m.
The encrypted classical channel is used during the Symmetrization
step of the protocol. Inset: the QPSK alphabet of coherent states with
amplitudes α ∈ C.
classical strings, one for Bob and one for Charlie, (B,C)m =
{φ(B,C)j }Lj=1 where the φ j are phases chosen uniformly at
random from our alphabet A4 = {1, i,−1,−i}. The signature
length L is an integer suitably chosen to ensure security.
(2) For each element φ(B,C)j Alice forms the corresponding
coherent state |αφ(B,C)j 〉 and sends it to B,C, Fig. 1. The
amplitude α is chosen to optimise security. By analogy with
classical digital signatures, we may think of the (B,C)m as
Alice’s private keys, and the corresponding sequences of
quantum states as her public keys. In contrast to our previous
QDS protocol we take Bm = Cm [11,13]. Since coherent
states are nonorthogonal an eavesdropper on the quantum
channel cannot gain full information about Alice’s signatures.
(3) Bob and Charlie measure the phases of the received
states by heterodyne detection [24], and keep a record of
the alphabet states which are most incompatible with their
measurements, Fig. 2. For example, if Bob measures b ∈ C
with Re(b) > 0 and Im(b) > 0 then he will “eliminate” states
| − α〉 and | − iα〉 since these are the least likely of Alice’s
sent states to generate this outcome. Recipients Bob and
Charlie each now possess an “eliminated signature” [7,8,11]
of length L containing a record of which states were elimi-
nated at each position in the sequence. Since measurements
are performed immediately on receipt of the states, no quan-
tum memory is required [7].
(4) Symmetrization: Bob and Charlie swap a random L/2
elements of their eliminated signatures over their encrypted
classical channel, keeping the positions and values of the
swapped elements secret from Alice. Signature elements
which are forwarded by a recipient will no longer be used
by them in the protocol. This swapping will provide security
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FIG. 2. After measuring the phase of a distributed coherent state,
Bob and Charlie eliminate the two alphabet states which were least
likely to have given that outcome. (a) An individual measurement
outcome x with Re(x)  0, Im(x)  0. (b) The corresponding elimi-
nated signature element. The states | − α〉, | − iα〉 are the least likely
from our alphabet to give x, so they are eliminated.
against repudiation. Bob and Charlie each now possess an
eliminated signature in two halves, those elements received
directly from Alice and those received during this Sym-
metrization step.
B. Messaging stage: 5–7
(5) Messaging can occur at any time after distribution.
To sign m, Alice sends to Bob the classical triplet  =
(m,Bm,Cm), consisting of the message m and classical in-
formation B,Cm about the corresponding sent quantum states.
(6) Bob compares elements of (B,C)m with the correspond-
ing elements of his eliminated signatures, and counts the num-
ber of mismatches. A mismatch occurs if Bob has eliminated
a state which Alice claims to have sent. Note that even when
all parties are honest there will still be some probability of
mismatch as the alphabet states are not orthogonal, so if Alice
sent |α〉, Bob or Charlie can still measure Re(x) < 0. If there
are fewer than sBL/2 mismatches, for threshold sB, between
each half of his eliminated signature and Alice’s declaration,
then Bob accepts m as genuine. Otherwise, he rejects it and
the protocol aborts.
(7) Bob forwards  to Charlie, who similarly checks for
mismatches. Charlie accepts the message if there are fewer
than sCL/2 mismatches between elements of  and each half
of his eliminated signature. If Charlie also accepts m, then
the protocol has succeeded; otherwise, it aborts. The crucial
parameters in steps 6 and 7 are the s(B,C), which can be chosen
to optimize security.
III. SECURITY PROOF AND ATTACK ANALYSIS
To be secure, a QDS protocol must abort when a forging
or repudiation attack is attempted. From steps 6 and 7 in the
protocol, the protocol aborts if the number of mismatches
observed by Bob or Charlie is above sBL/2 or sCL/2, respec-
tively. We now demonstrate that a forgery or repudiaton attack
will induce such a large number of mismatches, so the attacks
are therefore detectable. We also show that in the absence
of an attack the protocol succeeds, that is, it is robust. The
protocol fails if it allows a forging or repudiation attack, or
if it aborts even when all parties are honest. The proofs of
robustness and security against repudiation from Ref. [11]
can be directly applied to our protocol. For completeness we
reproduce the key results in Eqs. (2) and (3) below, and full
proofs may be found in Ref. [11]. Importantly, the security
against forgery requires an alternative analysis and this will
be one of the main results presented in the paper.
A. Robustness
A QDS protocol is called robust if it succeeds when all par-
ties are honest, except with a negligible probability εrob. Since
the alphabet A4 of distributed states is highly nonorthogonal,
even when all parties are honest there is still a probability
perr that a recipient eliminates the state which Alice sent.
However, perr is predictable and can be estimated during the
protocol. For a pure loss channel with transmission T , the rate
perr corresponds to the probability of a heterodyne measure-
ment outcome Re(x) < 0 when Alice sent the coherent state
|α〉 with α ∈ R  0,
perr = 12 erfc
(√
T
2
α
)
. (1)
With mismatch rate perr, we may use Hoeffding’s inequalities,
Appendix A, to bound the probability that Bob or Charlie
detect more than s(B,C)L/2 mismatches as
εrob  2 exp[−(s(B,C) − perr )2L] (2)
provided that s(B,C) > perr. Equation (2) is derived in Ref. [11]
using Eq. (A3). The probability εrob of the protocol aborting
even when all parties are honest can thus be made arbitrarily
small by choice of L.
B. Security against repudiation
Alice succeeds in a repudiation attack if she convinces Bob
that a message is genuine and Charlie that it is fake. During
messaging, Alice will declare ˜Bm and ˜Cm chosen with the aim
that there should be fewer than sBL/2 mismatches with each
half of Bob’s signature, but more than sCL/2 mismatches with
at least one of Charlie’s halves.
Intuitively, security against repudiation arises from Sym-
metrization (step 4 of the protocol). Since the swapping
occurred in secret from Alice, she does not know who holds
a particular eliminated signature element. Alice is therefore
unlikely to succeed in creating a declaration which will pass
Bob’s test but fail Charlie’s.
The probability of successful repudiation is
εrep  2 exp
[
−(sC − sB)2 L4
]
, (3)
provided that sC > sB. Equation (3) is derived fully in
Ref. [11] using Eqs. (A2) and (A3). The probability εrep of
successful repudiation can thus be made arbitrarily small by
choice of L.
C. Security against forgery
It is the forging attack in which our analysis significantly
differs from Ref. [11]. In a successful forging attack, a dis-
honest player will declare some fake m′ with the aim that it
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is accepted as genuinely having originated with Alice. The
message m′ must have an appended signature ′Cm , and so a
forger’s goal is to determine a fake signature which will be ac-
cepted. Since Bob already knows half of Charlie’s eliminated
signature elements—those which Bob himself forwarded—
and since it is easier to convince Charlie than Bob to accept
a fake signature (sC > sB), the most dangerous forger is a
dishonest Bob. A bound for the probability that Bob succeeds
in a forging attack provides an automatic upper bound against
any other forging player.
Since the emphasis of earlier papers [6–11] was on in-
ternal dishonesty between participants, eavesdropping on the
quantum channels was not permitted. A dishonest Bob had
only his states received from Alice with which to gain infor-
mation about Charlie’s outcomes. However, Alice distributed
identical signatures Bm = Cm to Bob and to Charlie, so in
effect Bob had a perfect copy of Charlie’s signature. Now, to
mitigate against an eavesdropping Bob, we choose Bm = Cm,
so that even though dishonest Bob can gain some additional
information on Charlie’s quantum states, Bob now has a less
perfect copy of Charlie’s states than he did previously [13].
Dishonest Bob will eavesdrop on the quantum states as
Alice is distributing them to Charlie, and will try to deter-
mine what he can declare in ′Cm to not cause a mismatch.
Defining pe as the probability that Bob will induce a mis-
match on a given signature element, and sC as Charlie’s mis-
match threshold, the probability εforg of a successful forging
attack is
εforg  2 exp[−(pe − sC )2L], (4)
which is derived via Eq. (A2) by analogy with Ref. [11]. Since
sC  pe can be freely chosen, we must now calculate a lower
bound on the probability pe.
D. Calculating pe
Our main contribution is a bound for pe, which fully takes
into account the ambiguity in Bob’s declaration. This ambigu-
ity stems from the following. Because Charlie eliminates two
states, Fig. 2, there are two possible states from A4 which Bob
can declare without introducing a mismatch. Therefore, the
probability that Bob misidentifies an element of the eliminated
signature is not equivalent to the probability of mismatch.
We allow for this discrepancy by working directly in terms
of mismatch probability pe via an error variable E , and in
the proof we highlight quantities which are affected by the
degeneracy in Bob’s possible declaration. In what follows
we explicitly consider the QPSK alphabet A4. Our security
proof readily generalises to larger alphabets AN with N =
6, 8, 10, . . . , and the required modifications to the proof are
discussed in Appendix B.
Let Xj, 1  j  L/2 be an element of the half of C’s
eliminated signature which he received directly from Alice
and on which Bob will attempt to gain some information. We
write Xj = {x j1, x j2}, where x j1 and x j2 describe the states from
A4 which Charlie eliminated. The x j1 and x j2 must be adjacent
in A4, e.g., if x j1 = 1, then x j2 = ±i. Let the string Y = {y j} j
be Bob’s declaration, subject to an unspecified but optimal
POVM and classical strategy.
A mismatch occurs when y j = x j1 or y j = x j2. To analyze
the probability that this occurs we define a variable Ej , which
takes value 1 if a mismatch occurs at position j and 0 oth-
erwise. Then Bob’s average mismatch rate pe = P(Ej = 1).
Because Ej can take one of two values, the Shannon entropy
H (Ej ) is equal to the binary entropy h(pe) = −pe log pe −
(1 − pe) log (1 − pe).
Consider the conditional entropy H (Ej, x j1, x j2|y j ), which
is related to the uncertainty about whether a mismatch has
occured under Bob’s declaration y j . Using the chain rule for
conditional entropies [5] we write
H
(
Ej, x j1, x
j
2|y j
) = H(Ej |x j1, x j2, y j)+ H(x j1, x j2|y j). (5)
Since a choice of y j, x j1 and x
j
2 uniquely determines Ej , the
first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (5) must equal 0, so we
have
H
(
Ej, x j1, x
j
2|y j
) = H(x j1, x j2|y j). (6)
Using the chain rule for conditional entropies once more on
the left-hand side of Eq. (5),
H
(
Ej, x j1, x
j
2|y j
) = H(x j1, x j2|Ej, y j)+ H (Ej |y j )
 H
(
x
j
1, x
j
2|Ej, y j
)+ H (Ej ), (7)
where we can write the upper bound because conditioning
cannot increase entropy.
Combining Eqs. (6) and (7),
H
(
x
j
1, x
j
2|y j
)
 H
(
x
j
1, x
j
2|Ej, y j
)+ H (Ej )
= (1 − pe)H
(
x
j
1, x
j
2|E = 0, y j
)
+ peH
(
x
j
1, x
j
2|Ej = 1, y j
)+ H (Ej ). (8)
Now because of the ambiguity in Bob’s declaration, i.e.,
because there are two eliminated signature elements con-
sistent with a given Ej = 0 and y j , and since we can per-
mute and relabel x j1 ↔ x j2, we have H (x j1, x j2|Ej = 0, y j ) 
log2 4 = 2. We also use the fact that Charlie eliminates ex-
actly half of the alphabet to write H (x j1, x j2|Ej = 0, y j ) =
H (x j1, x j2|Ej = 1, y j ). Therefore,
H
(
x
j
1, x
j
2|y j
)
 2 + H (Ej ) = 2 + h(pe). (9)
From the definition of mutual information [5], we have
H
(
x
j
1, x
j
2|y j
) = H(x j1, x j2)− I(x j1, x j2 : y j)
 3 − χ(x j1, x j2 : y j), (10)
where we have used that the Holevo information χ maxi-
mizes the mutual information I over all POVMs, and that
H (x j1, x j2 ) = log2 8 = 3 because of the four possible elimi-
nated signature elements, and an additional factor of 2 due
to relabeling.
Combining Eqs. (9) and (10) we arrive at
h(pe)  1 − χ
(
x
j
1, x
j
2 : y j
)
, (11)
which is one of the main results of the paper. This inequality
can be implicitly solved for Bob’s mismatch rate pe, and pro-
vides security against collective attacks provided that Bob’s
Holevo information χ can be estimated.
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FIG. 3. Schematic of the beamsplitter attack. Alice distributes
her state ρA through a lossy channel with transmission T , modeled
as a {T, 1 − T } beamsplitter with vacuum input at the fourth port.
Bob and Charlie collect their states from the reflected and transmitted
ports, respectively.
E. Attack analysis
Equations (4) and (11) determine the required signature
length to provide security of our scheme in any situation
where χ can be bounded. To gain some insight into the
behavior of our protocol, in what follows we restrict Bob
to two classes of attack, the beamsplitter attack and the
entangling-cloner attack, which correspond to a pure-loss
(ξ = 0%) and thermal-loss (ξ = 0%) channel, respectively.
In an implementation it is the measured excess noise ξ at
the receiver which will determine the attack class that Bob is
assumed to have performed [25]. In Sec. V we remark about
the optimality of these attacks.
By definition Bob’s Holevo information is [5]
χ
(
x
j
1, x
j
2 : y j
) = S(ρ jB)−∑
x
j
1,x
j
2
p
(
x
j
1, x
j
2
)
S
(
ρ
x
j
1,x
j
2
B
)
, (12)
with S(.) the Von Neumann entropy, ρ jB Bob’s total a priori
mixed state at position j, and ρx
j
1,x
j
2
B Bob’s state conditioned on
Charlie’s jth eliminated signature element Xj being {x j1, x j2}.
1. Beamsplitter attack
We first consider the so-called beamsplitter attack, Fig. 3,
in which a purely lossy channel is modeled using a beam-
splitter with transmission T and vacuum input at the fourth
port, and in which Bob collects his state ρ jB from the reflected
output port.
Letting |αk〉〈αk| with k = 1, 2, 3, 4 be an element of A4,
Alice’s average input state may be written as
ρ
j
A =
1
4
4∑
k=1
|αk〉〈αk|, (13)
which is transformed by the beamsplitter with vacuum input
to become
ρ
j
BC =
1
4
4∑
k=1
|
√
Tαk〉C〈
√
Tαk| ⊗ |
√
1 − Tαk〉B〈
√
1 − Tαk|.
(14)
FIG. 4. A single eliminated signature element corresponds to an
entire phase quadrant as an allowed region for the phase measure-
ment outcome. (a) An eliminated signature element. (b) The element
can be generated by any heterodyne measurement outcome in the
shaded region.
Then Bob’s a priori state ρ jB is given by
ρ
j
B =
1
4
4∑
k=1
|√1 − Tαk〉B〈
√
1 − Tαk|, (15)
from which the first term in Eq. (12) can be calculated.
Charlie performs heterodyne measurement on his half of
ρ
j
BC and receives outcome c j ∈ C. The state ρ jBC is trans-
formed as
ρ
j
B|c =
1
4
4∑
k=1
〈c|
√
Tαk〉〈
√
Tαk|c〉|
√
1 − Tαk〉B〈
√
1 − Tαk|
= 1
4
4∑
k=1
p(c|αk )|
√
1 − Tαk〉B〈
√
1 − Tαk|, (16)
where p(c|αk ) = 1/π exp (−|c −
√
Tαk|2) is the probability
of Charlie measuring c when the state |√Tαk〉 is received,
and |c〉 is a coherent state centered on c ∈ C.
On average, each eliminated signature element Xj =
{x j1, x j2} is equally likely, so for Eq. (12) it will suffice to
calculate S(ρx
j
1,x
j
2
B ) for just one. An element Xj is uniquely
determined by the quadrant in which the outcome c lies,
Fig. 4. Using Eq. (16) we may write
ρ
x
j
1,x
j
2
B =
∫
ρ
j
B|c d
2c, (17)
where the integration is performed over an entire quadrant in
phase space. The states ρ jB and ρ
x
j
1,x
j
2
B from Eqs. (15) and (17)
can be inserted into Eq. (12) and the mismatch rate pe can now
be calculated.
2. Entangling cloner attack
The thermal loss channel exhibits both loss and excess
noise and can be modeled by a beamsplitter with a thermal
state ρth(n¯) input into the fourth port, where n¯ is the average
number of photons in the thermal state. However, the presence
of this thermal noise will allow an eavesdropping Bob to
hide a more general attack, known as an entangling cloner
attack [24,30]. In this attack, Bob starts with an entangled
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FIG. 5. Schematic of the entangling cloner attack. Bob replaces
the vacuum input into the beamsplitter by one of his TMSV modes,
and collects the output. Correlations between the output and his
retained TMSV mode provide him with an additional advantage,
while the attack manifests itself just as thermal noise in the channel.
Charlie measures an excess noise ξ above shot noise.
two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state, and one of the
two entangled modes is injected into the fourth port of the
beamsplitter, Fig. 5. Once again he collects the reflected
output, and performs an optimal collective measurement on
his two modes. Since the TMSV state purifies the thermal
state [24], this attack manifests itself just as thermal noise in
the channel.
After the beamsplitter, Bob holds a two-mode state which
is entangled with Charlie’s. The full state is
|〉 jB′1B2C = ˆDB′1 (
√
1 − Tα) ˆDC (
√
Tα)
∞∑
m=0
Gm√
m!
(√
T aˆ†B′1 −
√
1 − T aˆ†C
)m
|0〉B′1 |m〉B2 |0〉C, (18)
where Gm = (tanh r)m/ cosh r; n¯ = sinh2 r is the average
number of thermal photons in one mode of the input TMSV
state; and ˆD(α) = exp (αaˆ† − α∗aˆ) is the displacement oper-
ator. After performing heterodyne measurement on mode C
and receiving outcome c ∈ C, the state ρ jB|c(n¯) = 〈c|〉〈|c〉
can be used to calculate the Holevo information as before via
Eqs. (12) and (17). The states |〉B′1B2C and ρ jB|c(n¯) are derived
in Appendix C.
Finally, we note that Charlie’s probability of measuring
c ∈ C when Alice sends state |αk〉 through the channel with
transmission T and thermal noise input ρth(n¯) is [25]
p(c|αk )(n¯) =
exp
[
−|c−
√
Tαk |2
1+(1−T )n¯
]
π [1 + (1 − T )n¯] , (19)
and so the excess noise measured at Charlie is ξ =
(1 − T )n¯/2. From Eq. (19) we can calculate perr(ξ ) as the
probability P(Re(c) < 0|α)(n¯) that Charlie’s heterodyne out-
put eliminates the sent state, analogously with Eq. (1).
F. Signature length L
Now that we have calculated pe and perr for both beam-
splitter and entangling-cloner attacks, the probability εfail that
the protocol fails can be found by calculating via Eqs. (2), (3),
and (4) the probability that the protocol is not robust εrob; the
FIG. 6. Signature lengths L required to securely sign a 1 bit
message, for channel transmission T and coherent state amplitude
α. The length L → ∞ as T → 0, but remains modest at the re-
alistic distances denoted by vertical gridlines. Left gridline: T =
0.20 (approximately 20-km fiber); right gridline: T = 0.48 (approx-
imately 1-km fiber). Solid: ξ = 0% (beamsplitter attack). Dashed:
ξ = 2% (entangling-cloner attack). The required signature length L
is strongly influenced by the choice of α.
probability of successful repudiation εrep; and the probability
of successful forgery εforg. For a figure of merit, we assume
that the protocol can fail in any of these ways with equal
probability and set
εfail = εrob = εrep = εforg. (20)
By choosing sB = perr + (pe + perr )/4 and sC = perr +
3(pe − perr )/4 we satisfy the second two equalities, and so
the overall probability of failure becomes
εfail  2 exp
[
−(pe − perr )2 L16
]
, (21)
provided that pe  sC  sB  perr. The security parameter
g = pe − perr quantifies the advantage that an honest party
holds over a dishonest party, and if g > 0, then our QDS
protocol can be made arbitrarily secure by an appropriate
choice of L. The signature length L required to sign m to a
security level εfail may thus be calculated using Eq. (21).
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROTOCOL
The main figure of merit for a QDS protocol is the
signature length, L, required to sign a 1 bit message to a
given security level εfail. We choose the probability of failure
to be εfail = 0.01% and solve Eq. (21) for L, under both
beamsplitter and entangling-cloner attacks, corresponding to
ξ = 0% and ξ > 0%, respectively, and for several different
coherent state amplitudes used in the alphabet.
The signature lengths for the A4 alphabet are displayed in
Fig. 6. As expected, we see that L → ∞ as T → 0 and the
protocol can no longer be made secure in this limit. However,
for all T > 0, the security parameter g is positive and so
the protocol is secure, albeit with infeasibly large L for the
smallest values of T . The presence of realistic amounts of
excess noise increases L at all T , with increasingly drastic
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FIG. 7. Security parameter g as it varies with α for T =
[0.61 (upper curve), 0.47, 0.19, 0.11, 0.01 (lower curve)]. Solid:
ξ = 0%. Dashed: ξ = 1%. The optimal α which players should pick
varies with T but only slightly varies with ξ . Horizontal gridlines
denote O(L) starting from L ∼ 105 at g = 0.038 (top) and increasing
by a factor of 10 at subsequent lower gridlines, Eq. (21). Red,
dot-dashed: The g varying with α for 1 km (upper curve) and 20 km
fiber (lower curve) under the previous protocol [11], for ξ = 0%.
Note that under [11] the optimal α’s do not vary with either T or ξ .
effects at small T —even though Charlie will allow fewer
thermal photons in the channel as T decreases.
For values of T corresponding to realistic metropolitan dis-
tances we observe that our QDS scheme can be made secure
with surprisingly short signature lengths L. Assuming optical
fiber with 0.2 dB loss per km, we calculate T corresponding
to 1- and 20-km channels. At these distances, displayed in
the vertical gridlines of Fig. 6, we can securely sign a 1 bit
message with only L ∼ O(105) coherent states. Combined
with fast sending rates typical to the CV platform, this opens
up the possiblity of signing a message in times competitive
with the O(10−1) s found in DV schemes [17] (and see Fig. 7
of Ref. [21]). For example, with a feasible sending rate of
100 MHz our protocol could securely sign a 1 bit message
in O(10−3) s over 20 km.
The signature lengths required under our security proof are
shorter than under our previous protocol, despite now mak-
ing fewer assumptions about the power of an eavesdropping
party. For example, at T = 0.5, our current protocol gives
L = 34 139, whereas the protocol from Ref. [11] would give
L = 44 010. This improvement is because in our protocol
we have chosen Bm = Cm, so a dishonest party is forced to
eavesdrop and thus receives an imperfect copy of Charlie’s
states, whereas previously they were given a perfect copy
[11,13].
To understand the optimal behavior of our protocol, we
consider security parameter g instead of signature length, via
Eq. (21). We observe in Fig. 7 that the maximum g—therefore
smallest L—varies strongly with T and α and only slightly
with ξ . Therefore, for a given channel it is important to pick
the optimal α to minimize the quantum resources required for
security. This is in sharp contrast to Ref. [11], shown in Fig. 7
by red, dot-dashed lines, where the optimal α ≈ 0.5 for all
channels.
FIG. 8. Optimal signature length L for ξ = 0%. At each trans-
mission T the coherent state amplitude αopt is chosen to minimize
L. We have considered alphabets A4, A6, A8, and A2. Solid: A4.
Dashed: A6. Gray, solid: A8. Dot-dashed: A2. Inset: the correspond-
ing αopt. Choosing an alphabet size larger than A4 decreases the
optimal αopt while slightly increasing the required signature length
L. As the alphabet size increases it becomes closer to a Gaussian
distribution, and so the beamsplitter and entangling-cloner attack
become increasingly optimal. The largest jump in protocol efficiency
occurs from A2 to A4. Vertical gridlines denote T corresponding to
the 20-km (left) and 1-km (right) fiber.
For each channel we minimize L by optimizing over α,
and the results are plotted in Fig. 8, with the required αopt
displayed in the inset. For large T a large α is optimal. In this
case an eavesdropper gains little information so honest parties
should try to minimize their mismatch rate. As T decreases
a smaller α will increase the eavesdropper’s mismatch rate
but at the cost of also increasing honest mismatches. Taking
ξ = 0% was found to slightly decrease αopt.
We have also considered the alphabet sizes A6, A8, and
A2, Appendix B, with their optimal L’s also plotted in Fig. 8.
Surprisingly, although for larger alphabets the optimal α is
decreased, the minimal L is slightly increased. As has been
found elsewhere [29], the biggest leap in behavior should oc-
cur between A2 → A4, and indeed this is what we see, noting
that for A2 we no longer need to think about an eliminated
signature or ambiguity and we simply consider optimal guess-
ing probabilities. As the alphabet tends toward a Gaussian
mixture of coherent states, we expect the two attack strategies
considered in this paper to become increasingly optimal,
which explains the slight increase in L for larger alphabets.
V. DISCUSSION
Quantum digital signatures, which allow for secure au-
thentication of a classical message, have only recently been
proven secure against a quantum eavesdropper on the chan-
nels [13,15,16]. In the present paper, we have advanced QDS
protocols operating on the continuous-variable platform by
providing security against beamsplitter and entangling-cloner
attacks on the quantum channels. Surprisingly, short signature
lengths (even shorter than in Ref. [11] under the assumption of
secure quantum channels) are sufficient to ensure secure QDS
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over metropolitan distances. The security proof has enabled us
to include the fact that for each eliminated signature element
there are multiple “correct” declarations which a dishonest
player can make, and which must be taken into account.
Our security proof relied on several assumptions which re-
flect the state-of-the-art of CV quantum cryptography with our
chosen alphabet, but which future work should endeavour to
relax [24,25,31,32]. First, the eavesdropping attacks permitted
by a malevolent Bob in this work do not give him the full
power afforded by quantum mechanics. The non-Gaussianity
of our alphabet is restrictive here, and the entangling-cloner
attack is only expected to be optimal as the limiting case
that the alphabet becomes Gaussian, i.e., for α → 0 [33,34].
For our alphabet with discrete modulation, a wider class
of non-Gaussian attacks may provide an eavesdropper with
an advantage, and more work is needed to explore optimal
classes of non-Gaussian attack. In a general protocol these
effects could be taken into account for example by tomograph-
ically reconstructing the state ρB which maximizes the Holevo
information χ , while remaining consistent with Charlie’s
measurement outcomes—though we note that the resources
required for this will be expensive and may undermine the
ease-of-use which our scheme currently boasts. Another pos-
sible route towards improving security would be an extension
of results known for QKD with two-state [31] and three-state
[32] alphabets to our A4, noting recent progress in Ref. [25].
Techniques used in our security proof will in future allow
us for possibility to explore different security tasks, such as
secret sharing [35] or oblivious transfer [36], and to design
protocols relying on the same modest physical requirements
which we used here. One may also begin to consider con-
sider finite-size effects [37], which are intrinsic to any QDS
scheme, noting the operational links between the guessing
probabilities considered in this paper and the smooth min-
entropy [38]. Advances in calculating optimal lower bounds
for the smooth min-entropy will have immediate and direct
application to CV QDS, and may be readily incorporated into
our security proof.
The security of our QDS protocol and the short time
required to sign a message, stemming both from the security
proof and the practical advantages of the CV platform, make
CV QDS an attractive scheme for secure communications
in a quantum future. It may soon be possible to move to
real-world implementation of our scheme, with opportunity
to run alongside related QKD schemes [39].
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APPENDIX A: HOEFFDING’S INEQUALITIES
Hoeffding’s inequalities [40,41] provide a bound for the
probability that the empirical mean of n independent out-
comes differs from the expectation. The most useful form for
our purposes is shown below, and we briefly demonstrate how
they may be utilized in our security proof. A full treatment can
be found in Refs. [10,11].
1. Hoeffding’s inequalities
Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent binary random variables.
Let ¯X be their empirical mean, and let E( ¯X ) be their expected
value. Then for every ε  0 the following are true
P( ¯X − E( ¯X )  ε)  exp(−2ε2n),
P(E( ¯X ) − ¯X  ε)  exp(−2ε2n). (A1)
2. Application to QDS
Let F be a string of declared phases, and G be an elimi-
nated signature. Define a string E
Ej =
{
1 if Fj is eliminated in Gj,
0 otherwise,
which measures the number of mismatches between F and G.
All strings are of length n. We wish to bound the probability
that the number of mismatches is below some threshold sn,
or equivalently the probability P( ¯E  s) that the observed
mismatch rate ¯E = 1/n∑nj=1 Ej is below s. Then we have
P( ¯E  s) = P[E( ¯E ) − ¯E  E( ¯E ) − s]
 exp{−2[E( ¯E ) − s]2n}, (A2)
where the equality follows trivially provided that E(E ) − s 
0, and the inequality is an application of Eq. (A1). Bounds on
P(s  ¯E ) may be similarly derived:
P(s  ¯E )  exp{−2[s − E( ¯E )]2n}. (A3)
APPENDIX B: LARGER ALPHABETS
We show that our central result, Eq. (11), holds for all
alphabets AN with N = 2k; k ∈ N; consisting of coherent
states equally distributed about the origin in phase space. We
also remark on any required modifications to the calculations
presented in the paper.
During the protocol, Bob and Charlie should eliminate
exactly N/2 coherent states, using the same strategy as in
Fig 2. Otherwise, the running of the protocol remains the
same.
As before, Eqs. (5)–(7), we start with H (Ej, x j1, . . . ,
x
j
N/2|y j ) and use the chain rule for conditional entropies twice,
giving
H
(
x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N/2|y j
) = H(x j1, . . . , x jN/2|Ej, y j)+ H (Xj |y j ),
once we have taken into account that H (Ej |x j1, . . . ,
x
j
N/2, y j ) = 0. Using H (Ej |y j )  h(pe) and the fact that Bob
and Charlie eliminate exactly N/2 out of N possible alphabet
states, we arrive at
H
(
x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N/2|y j
)
 H
(
x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N/2|Ej = 0, y j
)+ h(pe),
therefore
H
(
x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N/2
)− χ(x j1, . . . , x jN/2 : y j)
 H
(
x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N/2|Ej = 0, y j
)+ h(pe).
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To complete the proof of Eq. (11) we simply observe
H
(
x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N/2
) = log2
(
N × N
2
!
)
,
H
(
x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N/2|Ej = 0, y j
) = log2
(
N
2
× N
2
!
)
,
where we have taken into account relabeling, and Eq. (11)
follows immediately.
The quantities used to calculate the Holevo information
must also be altered to reflect the different alphabet. Bob’s
a priori state becomes
ρ
j
B =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|√1 − Tαk〉B〈
√
1 − Tαk|, (B1)
the state ρ jB|c is similarly transformed—both for beamsplitter
attack and entangling-cloner attack. The integration limits of
Eq. (17) are also altered so that each segment now occupies
an angular width of 2π/N . Finally, since Bob and Charlie
eliminate exactly N/2 of the alphabet, the probability perr that
a heterodyne measurement should eliminate Alice’s sent state
remains unchanged.
APPENDIX C: TWO-MODE SQUEEZED VACUUM
We will calculate the |〉 jB1′B2C and ρ
j
B|c required for the
entangling cloner attack, Fig. 5. Our starting point is the
state shared between Alice and Bob before the channel.
Alice generates coherent state |α〉 and Bob generates a two-
mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state [42]. Then Alice and
Bob share the three-mode state,
|α〉A|TMSV〉B1B2 = ˆDA(α)|0〉A
∞∑
m=0
Gm
(
aˆ†B1
)m
√
m!
|0〉B1 |m〉B2 , (C1)
where |α〉 = ˆD(α)|0〉 and ˆD(α) = exp (αaˆ† − α∗aˆ) is the
displacement operator; and where we have written |m〉B1 =
(aˆ†B1 )
m
/
√
m!|0〉B1 . The coefficient Gm = (tanh r)m/ cosh r
where r parametrizes the number of thermal photons n¯ in each
of the two modes via n¯ = sinh2 r.
The beamsplitter transforms our creation operators as(
aˆC
aˆB′1
)
=
( √
T −√1 − T√
1 − T √T
)(
aˆA
aˆB1
)
. (C2)
Using Eq. (C2) we transform our input state to give
|〉 jB′1B2C = ˆDB′1 (
√
1 − Tα) ˆDC (
√
Tα)
∞∑
m=0
Gm
(√
T aˆ†B′1 −
√
1 − T aˆ†C
)m
√
m!
|0〉B′1 |m〉B2 |0〉C,
(C3)
where we have used the fact that aˆB′1 and aˆC commute.
The state Eq. (C3) may be computed by using the binomial
expansion on the brackets, and the state ρ jB|c(n¯) = 〈c|〉〈|c〉
can now be computed.
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